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Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005) have recently emphasized that the conventional model of
unemployment dynamics due to Mortensen-Pissarides(1994) has diﬃculty acccounting for the
relatively smooth behavior of wages and volatile behavior of employment over the business
cycle. We address this issue by modifying the MP framework to allow for staggered multi-
period wage contracting. What emerges is a tractable relation for wage dynamics that is a
natural generalization of the period-by-period Nash bargaining outcome in the conventional
formulation. An interesting side-product is the emergence of spillover eﬀects of average wages
on the bargaining process. We then show that reasonable calibration of the model can account
for the reasonably well for the cyclical behavior of wages and labor market activity observed in
the data. The spillover eﬀects turn out to be important in this respect.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
A long-standing challenge in macroeconomics is accounting for the relatively smooth behavior of
real wages over the business cycle along with the relatively volatile behavior of employment. A
recent body of research, beginning with Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005) has re-ignited interest in
addressing this challenge. These authors show, among other things, that the conventional model
of unemployment dynamics due to Mortensen and Pissarides (hereafter “MP”) cannot account
for the key cyclical movements in labor market activity. The basic problem is that the mechanism
for wage determinism within this framework, period-by-period Nash bargaining between ﬁrms and
workers, induces too much volatility in wages. This exaggerated procyclical movement in wages,
in turn, dampens the cyclical movement in ﬁrms’ incentives to hire. The authors proceed to show
that with the introduction of ad hoc wage stickiness, the framework can account for employment
volatility. Of course, this begs the question of what are the primitive forces that might underlies
this wage rigidity.
A rapidly growing literature has emerged to take on this puzzle. Much of this work attempts to
provide an axiomatic foundation for wage rigidity, explicitly building up from assumptions about
the information structure, and so on. To date, due t oc o m p l e x i t y ,t h i sw o r kh a sf o c u s e dm a i n l yo n
qualitative ﬁndings and has addressed quantitative issues only in a limited way.
In this paper we take a pragmatic approach to modelling wage rigidity, with the aim of devel-
oping a framework that is tractable for empirical analysis. In particular, we retain the empirically
appealing feature of Nash bargaining, but modify the conventional MP model to allow for stag-
gered multi-period wage contracting. Each period, only a subset of ﬁrms and workers negotiate a
wage contract. Each wage bargain, further, is between a ﬁrm and it’s existing workforce: Workers
hired in-between contract settlements receive the existing wage. We restrict the form of the wage
contract to call for a ﬁxed wage per period over an exogenously given horizon. Though it would
be undoubtedly preferable to completely endogenize the contract structure, these restrictions are
reasonable from an empirical standpoint. The payoﬀ is a simple empirically appealing wage equa-
tion that is an intuitive generalization of the standard Nash bargaining outcome. The gain over a
simple ad hoc wage adjustment mechanism is that the key primitive parameter of the model is the
average frequency of wage adjustment, as opposed to an arbitrary partial adjustment coeﬃcient
in a wage equation. In this way, the staggered contracting structure provides more discipline in
evaluating the model than do simple ad hoc adjustment mechanisms.
The use of time dependent staggered price and wage setting, of course, is widespread in macro-
economic modelling, beginning with Taylor (1980) and Calvo (1983). More recently, Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), Smets and Wouters (2004) have found that staggered wage con-
tracting is critical to the empirical performance of the recent vintage of dynamic general equilibrium
(DGE) macro frameworks (i.e., sticky prices alone are not suﬃcient). There are, however, some
important distinguishing features of our approach. First, macro models with staggered wage setting
typically have employment adjusting along the intensive margin. That is, wage stickiness enhances
2ﬂuctuations in hours worked as opposed to total employment. As a consequence, these frameworks
are susceptible to Barro’s (1977) argument that wages may not be allocational in this kind of envi-
ronment, given that ﬁrm’s and workers have an on-going relationship. If wages are not allocational,
of course, then wage rigidity does not inﬂuence model dynamics. By contrast, in the model we
present, wages aﬀect employment at the extensive margin: They inﬂuence the rate at which ﬁrms
add new workers to their respective labor forces. As emphasized by Hall (1977), in this kind of
setting the Barro’s critique does not apply.
As e c o n dk e yd i ﬀerence involves the nature of the wage contracting process. In the conventional
macro models, monopolistically competitive workers set wages. Here, ﬁrms and workers bargain
over wages in a setting with search and matching frictions. As a consequence, some interesting
“spillover” eﬀects emerge of the average market wage on the contract wage. These spillover eﬀects
are a product of the staggered contract/bargaining environment. They introduce additional sticki-
ness in the movement of real wages, much the same way that real rigidities introduce nominal price
stickiness in models of price setting.
In section 2 we present the model. In section 3 we characterize the basic features of the model,
including a set of simple dynamic equations for wages and the hiring rate, obtained by considering
a local approximation of the model about the steady state. We also exposit the spillover eﬀects
that inﬂuence the wage bargaining process, contributing to overall wage stickiness. In section 4 we
examine the empirical performance of the model and show that the framework does a good job of
accounting for the basic features of the model, including wage dynamics. Concluding remarks are
in section 5. Finally, the appendix provides an explicit derivation of all the key results.
2 The Model
The framework is a variation of the Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching model (Mortensen
and Pissarides 1994, Pissarides 2000). The main diﬀerence is that we allow for staggered multiperiod
wage contracting. Within the standard framework, workers and ﬁrms negotiate wages based on
period-by-period Nash bargaining. We keep the Nash bargaining framework, but in the spirit of
Taylor (1980), only a fraction of ﬁr m sa n dw o r k e r sr e - s e tw a g e si na n yg i v e np e r i o d . A sw e l l ,
they strike a bargain that lasts for multiple periods. Workers hired in between contracting periods
receive the existing contract wage
For technical reasons, there are two other diﬀerences from MP. First, because it will turn out
to be important for us to distinguish between existing and newly hired workers at a ﬁrm, we drop
the assumption of one worker per ﬁrm and instead allow ﬁrms to hire a continuum of workers. We
assume constant returns to scale, however, which greatly simpliﬁes the bargaining problem. Second,
we drop the conventional assumption of a ﬁxed cost per vacancy opened and instead assume that
ﬁrms face quadratic adjustment costs of adjusting employment size. The reason is as follows: With
staggered wage setting, there will arise a dispersion of wages across ﬁrms in equilibrium. Quadratic
3costs of adjusting employment ensure a determinate equilibrium in the presence of wage dispersion.
Finally, we embed our search and matching framework within a simple intertemporal general
equilibrium framework in order to study the dynamics of unemployment and wages. Following
Merz (1995),we adopt the representative family construct, which eﬀectively involves introducing
complete consumption insurance.
2.1 Unemployment, Vacancies and Matching
Let us now be more precise about the details: We index ﬁrms by i ∈ [0,1]. Each ﬁrm i employs
nt(i) workers at time t. It also posts vt(i) vacancies in order to attract new workers for the next





0 nt(i)di. The total number of unemployed workers is ut is given by
ut =1− nt (1)
Following convention, we assume that the number of new hires or “matches”, mt, is a function




The probability a ﬁrm ﬁl l sav a c a n c yi np e r i o dt, qt,i sg i v e nb y
qt = mt/vt (3)
Similarly, the probability an unemployed worker ﬁnds a job, st,i sg i v e nb y
st = mt/ut. (4)
Both ﬁrms and workers take qt and st as given. Finally, each ﬁrm exogenously separates from a
fraction (1 − ρ) of its workers each period where, ρ is the probability a worker “survives” with the
ﬁrm until the next period.
2.2 Firms
Each period, ﬁrms produce output using capital and labor. To make the bargaining problem
between ﬁrms and workers meaningful, we introduce costs of adjusting employment. As we noted
earlier, because we will have wage dispersion across ﬁrms, we introduce quadratic labor adjustment
costs, instead of the usual assumption of proportional hiring costs. For simplicity, we assume capital
is perfectly mobile across ﬁrms and that there is a competitive rental market in capital.
Let Ft (i) denote the value of ﬁrm i,yt (i) output, kt (i) the capital stock, wt (i) the wage rate,
zt the rental rate of capital, at economy-wide productivity and xt (i) the hiring rate, speciﬁcally
4the percent change in the ﬁrm’s workforce from t to t +1 . In addition, let βEtΛt,t+1 be the ﬁrm’s
discount rate, where the parameter β is the household’s subjective discount factor. Given quadratic
costs of adjusting the workforce:










nt+1 (i)=ρnt (i)+qtvt (i) (7)
where the product of the ﬁrm’s probability of ﬁlling a vacancy, qt and the number of vacancies it
posts equals the number of new hires. The total workforce at t +1is then the sum of the number
of surviving workers, ρnt (i), and new hires qtvt (i).





Note that the ﬁrm knows the hiring rate with certainty at time t, since it knows that likelihood qt
that each vacancy it posts will be ﬁlled.
At any time, the ﬁrm chooses the hiring rate (by posting vacancies) and its capital stock, given
its existing employment stock, nt (i), the probability of ﬁlling a vacancy, the rental rate on capital
and the current and expected path of wages. If it is a ﬁrm that is able to renegotiate the wage,
it bargains with its workforce over a new contract. If it is not renegotiating, it takes as given the
wage at the previous period’s level, as well the likelihood it will be renegotiating in the future.
We next consider the ﬁrm’s hiring and capital rental decisions, and defer a bit the description
of the wage bargain. Let Jt (i) be the value to the ﬁrm of adding another worker at time t:







2 + ρβEtΛt,t+1Jt+1 (i) (9)
Then the ﬁrst order condition for vacancy posting equates the marginal cost of adding a worker
with the discounted marginal beneﬁt:
κxt (i)=βEtΛt,t+1Jt+1 (i) (10)








With Cobb-Douglas production and perfectly mobile capital, output/capital ratios are equalized
across ﬁrms. It follows that capital/labor ratios and output/labor ratios are also equalized.
5Let fnt denote the ﬁrm’s marginal product of labor at t (i.e., fnt =( 1 −α)yt/nt). Then combining










2 + ρκxt+1 (i)
i
(12)
The hiring rate thus depends on a discounted stream of the ﬁrm’s expected future surplus from the





Let Vt (i) be the value to a worker of employment at ﬁrm i and let Ut be the value of unemployment.
Vt (i),i sg i v e nb y
Vt (i)=wt (i)+βEtΛt,t+1 [ρVt+1 (i)+( 1− ρ)Ut+1] (13)
Note that this value depends on the wage speciﬁct oﬁrm i, wt (i), as well as the likelihood the
worker will remain employed in the subsequent period. The average value of employment, Vt,w h i c h
depends on the average wage wt,i s :
Vt = wt + βEtΛt,t+1 [ρVt+1 +( 1− ρ)Ut+1] (14)
In turn, the value of unemployment is given by
Ut = b + βEtΛt,t+1 [stVt+1 +( 1− st)Ut+1] (15)
where b is the worker’s outside option, taken to be unemployment beneﬁts, and st is the probability
of ﬁnding a job for the subsequent period. Here we assume that the value of ﬁnding a job next period
simply corresponds to the average value of working next period across ﬁrms. That is, unemployed
workers do not have a priori knowledge of which ﬁrms might be paying higher wages. They instead
just randomly ﬂock to ﬁrms posting vacancies.
The worker’s surplus at ﬁrm i, Ht (i),and average worker surplus, Ht, are given by, respectively:
Ht (i)=Vt (i) − Ut (16)
Ht = Vt − Ut (17)
It follows that:
Ht (i)=wt (i) − b + βEtΛt,t+1 (ρHt+1 (i) − stHt+1) (18)
62.4 Consumption and Saving
Following Merz and others, we use the representative family construct, which gives rise to perfect
consumption insurance. In particular, the family has employed workers at all ﬁrms and unemployed
workers pool their incomes before choosing per capita consumption and asset holdings. In addi-
tion to wage income and unemployment beneﬁts, the family has a diversiﬁed ownership stake in
ﬁrms, which pay out proﬁts Πt. Households also receive government transfers, TRt,w h i c hm a yb e
negative. They may either consume, ct, or save in the form of capital, which may rent to ﬁrms at
the rate zt. Let Ωt be the value function for the representative household. Then the maximization
problem may be expressed as




ct + kt+1 = wtnt +( 1− nt)b +( zt +1− δ)kt + Πt + TRt
Let λt ≡ u0(ct). Then the ﬁrst necessary conditions for consumption/saving yields:
λt = βEtλt+1 (zt+1 +1− δ) (20)
2.5 Nash Bargaining and Wage Dynamics
We restrict the form of the wage contract to call for a ﬁxed wage per period over an exogenously
given length of time. Though it would be undoubtedly preferable to completely endogenize the
contract structure, these restrictions are reasonable from an empirical standpoint. The payoﬀ will
be a simple empirically appealing wage equation that is an intuitive generalization of the standard
Nash bargaining outcome. In particular, given these restrictions on the form of the contract, workers
and ﬁrms determine the contract wage through Nash bargaining.
We introduce staggered multi-period wage contracting in a way that simpliﬁes aggregation. In
particular, each period a ﬁrm has a ﬁxed probability 1 − λ that it may re-negotiate the wage.
This adjustment probability is independent of its history. Thus while how long an individual wage
contract lasts is uncertain, the average duration is ﬁxed at 1/(1 − λ). The coeﬃcient λ is thus a
measure of the degree of wage stickiness that can be calibrated to match the data. The simple
Poisson adjustment process, further, implies that it is not necessary to keep track of individual
ﬁrms’ wage histories, which makes aggregation simple. In the end, the model will deliver a simple
relation for the evolution of wages that is the product of Nash bargaining in conjunction with
staggered wage setting.
Firms that enter a new wage agreement at t negotiate with the existing workforce, including
the recent new hires. Due to constant returns, all workers are the same at the margin. The wage
is chosen so that the negotiating ﬁrm and the marginal worker share the surplus from the marginal
7match. Given the symmetry to which we just alluded, all workers employed at the ﬁrm receive
the same newly-negotiated wage. When ﬁrms are not allowed to renegotiate the wage, all existing
and newly hired workers employed at the ﬁrm receive the wage paid the previous period. In the
benchmark case where the contract length corresponds to just one period, wage dynamics are just
as in the standard model (and behave counterfactually as recently argued.)
Let w∗
t denote the wage of a ﬁrm that renegotiates at t. Given constant returns, all sets of
renegotiating ﬁrms and workers at time t face the same problem, and thus set the same wage. As
we noted earlier, the ﬁrm negotiate with the marginal worker over the surplus from the marginal
match. We assume Nash bargaining, which implies that the wage w∗




where Ht (r) and Jt (r) are the value of J and H for renegotiating ﬁrms.












− Wt (r) (22)
Ht (r)=Wt (r) − Et
∞ P
s=0
(ρβ)Λt,t+s [b + st+sβΛt+s,t+s+1Ht+s+1] (23)


















Intuitively, the ﬁrm’s surplus from the marginal worker, Jt (r), is discounted earnings, fnt+s,p l u s
savings on adjustment costs, κ
2xt+s (r)
2, net expected wage payments, Wt (r). Note that the latter
takes into account the expected life of the current wage contract as well as expected renegotiations
that will take place in the future. In turn, the marginal worker’s surplus, Ht (r), depends on
the expected discounted value of wage payments over both the existing contract and subsequent
contracts, net the discounted sum of ﬂow value of unemployment, b + st+sβΛt+s,t+s+1Ht+s+1.
The solution to the Nash bargaining problem, then, is
ηJt (r)=( 1− η)Ht (r) (26)
As the appendix shows, combining equations yields the following ﬁrst order forward looking diﬀer-





8where the forcing variable wtar










+( 1− η)(b + stβΛt,t+1EtHt+1) (28)
Observe that the target wage has the same form as the wage that would emerge under period-by-
period Nash bargaining. In particular, it is a convex combination of the ﬁrm’s surplus from the
match and the value of the worker’s outside option, where the weight depends on worker’s relative
bargaining power η. The ﬁrm’s surplus is the sum of the worker’s marginal product of labor and
the saving on adjustment costs. With our quadratic cost formulation, this saving is measured by
κ
2xt (r)
2. The value of the worker’s outside option in turn is the discounted sum of the ﬂow value
of unemployment, b + st+sβΛt+s,t+s+1Ht+s+1.
As in the conventional literature on time-dependent wage and price contracting (e.g. Taylor
(1980), Calvo (1983)), the contract wage depends on an expected discounted sum of the target
under perfectly ﬂexible adjustment, in this case wtar














As i g n i ﬁcant diﬀerence from the traditional literature on wage contracting, however, is that
spillover eﬀects emerge directly from the bargaining problem that have the contract wage depend
positively on the economy-wide average wage. We defer momentarily a characterization of these
spillover eﬀects. Finally, given that all ﬁrms that renegotiate at t choose the same contract wage
w∗
t and given that the average wage of ﬁrms that do not renegotiate is simply last periods aggregate
wage (since they are a random draw from the population), the aggregate wage is given by
wt =( 1− λ)w∗
t + λwt−1 (30)
2.6 Resource Constraints
We complete the model with the following resource constraint, which divides output between con-
sumption and adjustment costs.





This completes the description of the model.
93 Wage/Hiring Dynamics and Spillover Eﬀects
To gain some intuition for the model, we next derive loglinear equations for wages and hiring. In
doing so, we identify spillover eﬀects that make the wage bargain sensitive to the average wage
economy-wide in a way that works to enhance wage rigidity.
W eb e g i nb yd e r i v i n ga ne x p r e s s i o nf o rt h et a r g e tw a g e ,wtar
t (r), the forcing variable in the
diﬀerence equation for wages. In particular, by making use of the deﬁnitions of Ht and Ht (r),a l o n g
with the Nash bargaining condition and the vacancy posting condition, the component of the ﬂow
value of unemployment that stems from the discounted surplus conditional on new employment




κxt (r)+λβEtΛt,t+1∆t+1 (wt − w∗
t) (32)
Intuitively, the surplus value of moving from unemployment this period to employment next period
is likely to be high next period if the hiring rate is high today (implying a high marginal product of
labor tomorrow) and if economy-wide wages are high relative to the current contract wage (since
the new job is likely to oﬀer a more attractive wage relative to the existing wage).
The presence of the wage gap, wt −w∗
t, in the expression for βEtΛt,t+1Ht+1 introduces a direct
spillover eﬀe c to fe c o n o m y - w i d ew a g e so nwtar














t is the wage that would arise under perfectly ﬂexible wage adjustment economy wide,
















2 + κstxt)+( 1− η)b
Note that the expression for w
flex
t reﬂects that with period-by-period Nash bargaining economy-
wide, wages and hiring rates will be identical across ﬁrms. Observe that the wage gap positively
inﬂuences the target wage, reﬂecting that the worker’s ﬂow value of unemployment depends on the
average wage to the contract wage.
The diﬀerence between wtar
t (r) and w
flex
t depends not only on the wage gap, but also on the
diﬀerence between the hiring rate of re-negotiating ﬁrms, xt (r) and the economy-wide average xt.
To a ﬁrst approximation, however, this latter diﬀerence also depends on the wage gap, introducing
a second channel through which there is a spillover eﬀect of the average wage on the contract wage.
10In particular a loglinear expansion of the job creation condition yields the following relation, where
b zt (r) denotes the percent deviation of variable z from its steady state value:
b xt (r) − b xt = λβw(κx)
−1 (1 − (x + ρ)λβ)
−1 (b wt − b w∗
t) (35)
Intuitively, if the contract wage is below the average wage, re-negotiating ﬁrms will be hiring at a
faster rate than average. In contrast to the ﬁrst spillover eﬀect, which works by directly aﬀecting
the target wage, this second eﬀect works indirectly by inﬂuence the hiring rate, which in turn aﬀects
the target wage.
This indirect spillover reinforces the eﬀect of the direct one. Loglinearizing the equation for the







(b wt − b w∗
t) (36)
where τ1 and τ2 reﬂect the inﬂuence of the direct and indirect spillover eﬀects on the target wage,
respectively, and are given by
τ1 =( 1 − η)sλβ (37)
τ2 = η (x + s)λβ(1 − ρλβ)(1− (x + ρ)λβ)
−1
Next, loglinearizing the equation for the contract wage (27) and combining with equation (36)
yields:
b w∗
t =( 1− ρλβ) b w
flex
t + ρλβEt b w∗
t+1 + τ (b wt − b w∗
t) (38)
where τ reﬂects the combined inﬂuence of the spillover eﬀects:
τ = τ1 + τ2 (39)
The loglinearized wage index is in turn given by
b wt =( 1− λ) b w∗
t + λb wt−1 (40)
Combining these equations then yields the following second order diﬀerence equation for the
wage, with the frictionless wage, b w
flex
t , as the forcing variable:
b wt = γb b wt−1 + γflexb w
flex
t + γfEt b wt+1 (41)
11where




(1 − λ)(1− ρλβ)
λ
φ =1 + τ + γ + ρβ
with γb + γ + γf =1 . Due to staggered contracting, b wt depends on both the lagged wage b wt−1 as
well as the expected future wage Et b wt+1. Note that the spillover eﬀects, measured by τ, reduce the
sensitivity of the wage to movements in the both b w
flex
t and Et b wt+1. In this respect, this spillover
eﬀects work much the same way as how real wage rigidities enhance price stickiness in monetary
models with time-dependent pricing (see, e.g., Woodford, 2003).
Finally, the loglinearized frictionless wage is given by
b w
flex
t = ϕfn b fnt + ϕxb xt + ϕsb st (43)
where ϕfn = ηfnw−1,ϕ x = ηκx(x + s)w−1 and ϕs = ηκxsw−1. The key determinants of b w
flex
t
are the labor productivity, b fnt, the hiring rate b xt,and the job ﬁnding rate, b st. These are the cyclical
factors that inﬂuence the value of the marginal worker to the ﬁrm and the worker’s ﬂow value of
unemployment. With period-by-period Nash bargaining, the wage equals b w
flex
t . (This can be seen
by setting λ equal to zero in equations (38), (39), (37),(41), and (42).) With staggered contract,
however, the wage depends on a weighted sum of the current and expected future values of b w
flex
t ,
as well as the lagged wage.
Finally, loglinearizing the diﬀerence equation for the hiring rate (12) yields:
b xt = Etb Λt,t+1 +( β/κx)
³
fn b fnt+1 − wEt b wt+1
´
+ β (x + ρ)Etb xt+1 (44)
The hiring rate thus depends on current and expected movements of the marginal product of labor
relative to the wage. The stickiness in the wage due to staggered contracting, everything else equal,
that current and expected movement in the marginal product of labor will have a greater impact
on the hiring rate, than would have been the case otherwise.
We defer to the appendix a complete presentation of the loglinear equations of the model.
4M o d e l E v a l u a t i o n
4.1 Calibration
We choose a monthly calibration in order to properly capture the high rate of job ﬁnding in U.S.
data. Our parametrization is summarized in Table 1. There are twelve parameters to which we
12need to assign values. Five are conventional in the business cycle literature: the discount factor, β,
the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, γ, the depreciation rate, δ, the “share” parameter on capital
in the Cobb-Douglas production function, α, and the autoregressive parameter for the technology
shock, ρa. We use conventional values for all these parameters: β =0 .99
1
3, γ =1 .0, δ =0 .025/3,
α =0 .33,a n dρa =0 .95
1
3. Note that in contrast to the frictionless labor market model, the
parameter α does not necessarily correspond to the labor share, since the latter will in general
depend on the outcome of the bargaining process. However, here we simply follow convention by
setting α =0 .33 to facilitate comparison with the RBC literature. We also normalize the steady
state value of output per person, a,t o1.
Table 1: Parameters and steady state values
Output per person a 1.0
Production parameter α 0.33
Discount factor β 0.99
1
3
CRRA parameter γc 1.0
Capital depreciation rate δ 0.025/3
Technology shock ρa 0.95
1
3
Survival rate ρ 0.035
Matching parameter σ 0.5
Job ﬁnding probability s 0.35
Replacement ratio b/w 0.4
Bargaining power η 0.5
Renegotiation frequency 1-λ 1/12
There are an additional ﬁve parameters that are related to the search and matching literature:
the separation rate, 1−ρ, the job-ﬁnding probability, s, the matching function function parameter,
σ, the bargaining power parameter, η, and the replacement ratio, b/w. First, we set 1 − ρ =0 .035
and s =0 .35.T h e ﬁrst is standard in the literature and is supported by strong evidence from
alternative data sources. The second is higher then what has typically been used in the literature
and relies on recent evidence about the high job ﬁnding rate in the U.S. (Hall, 2005 and Shimer,
2005). Second, we choose the match elasticity to unemployment, σ, to be equal to 0.5.E s t i m a t e so f
this parameter in the literature range from values of 0.4 (Blanchard and Diamond, 1989) to about
0.7 (Shimer, 2005), consistently with evidence summarized by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).
Third, since there is no direct evidence on the value of the bargaining power, we initially assign
equal bargaining power to workers and ﬁrms and set η to 0.5. Importantly, in our model with
capital this value is consistent with a steady state labor share of about 2/3 as in the data. We then
choose the replacement ratio b/w to be 0.4. Note that the value of the replacement ratio includes
not only unemployment beneﬁts but also the value of leisure associated with unemployment.
13Finally, there are two parameters that are new and speciﬁc to this model. One is the cost of
adjustment parameter, κ, and the other is the frequency of wage contract negotiations 1 − λ.T h e
adjustment cost parameter is pinned down by the steady state of the model: Given the steady
state hiring rate and marginal product of labor, the steady state hiring rate and wage bargaining
relations pin down the steady state value of κ and the wage rate (see the appendix). We pick
the frequency of wage adjustment so that the average period wages are ﬁxed, 1/(1 − λ),i sw i t h i n
reason. We take 1 − λ to be 1/12, implying that wage contracts are renegotiated on average once
a year. We also explore below shortening the contract length, along with varying the bargaining
parameter.
Finally, given our parametrization, the steady values of unemployment, the hiring rate, the labor
share, as well as the consumption/output and investment/output ratios are determined. Table 2
reports these values.
Table 2: Implied parameters and steady state values
Baseline calibration Alternative calibration
4Qa n dη =0 .53 Qa n dη =0 .7
Unemployment rate 0.09 0.09
Hiring rate 0.035 0.035
Labor share 0.646 0.658
Adjustment cost parameter 152 66
Investment/output ratio 0.24 0.24
Consumption/output ratio 0.74 0.75
Adjustment costs/output ratio 0.02 0.01
4.2 Results
We judge the model against quarterly U.S. data from 1951:1-2005:1. For series that are available
monthly, we take quarterly averages. Since the artiﬁcial series that the model generates is based
on a monthly calibration, we also take quarterly averages of this data.
Most of the data is from the BLS. All variables are measured in logs. Output y is production
in the non-farm business sector. Employment n is all employees in the non-farm business sector.
The labor share ls and output per worker a are similarly from the non-farm business sector. The
wage w is the wage per person in non-farm business (i.e., w = ls · a). Unemployed u is civilian
unemployment 16 years old and over. Vacancies v are based on the help wanted advertising index
from the Conference Board. Finally, the data are HP ﬁltered with a conventional smoothing weight.
We examine the behavior of the model taking the technology shock as the exogenous driving
force. To illustrate how the wage contracting process aﬀects model dynamics, we ﬁrst examine
the impulse responses of the model economy to a unit increase in total factor productivity. The
14solid line in each panel of Figure 1 illustrates the response of the respective variable for our baseline
model. For comparison, the dotted line reports the response of the conventional ﬂexible wage model
with period-by-period Nash bargaining (obtained by setting λ =0 ).
Observe that in the conventional case with period-by-period wage adjustment, the response of
employment is relatively modest, conﬁrming the arguments of Hall and Shimer. There is also only
a modest response of other indicators of labor market activity, such as vacancies, v, unemployment
u, labor market tightness, θ = v/u, and the hiring rate x. Wages, by contrast, adjust quickly.
The resulting small adjustment of employment leads to output dynamics that closely mimic the
technology shock.
By contrast, in the model with staggered multiperiod contracting, the hiring rate jumps sharply
in the wake of the technology shock along with the measures of labor market activity. A substantial
rise in employment follows, certainly as compared to the conventional ﬂexible wage case. Associated
with the rise in employment, is a smooth drawn out adjustment in wages, directly a product of
the staggered multi-period contracting. The lagged rise in employment leads to a humped shaped
response of output, i.e., output continues to rise for several periods before reverting to trend, in
contrast to the technology shock which reverts immediately.
We next explore how well the model economy is able to account the overall volatility in the
data. Table 3 reports the standard deviation, autocorrelation, and contemporaneous correlation
with output for the nine key variables of the model. The standard deviations are normalized
relative to output. Model Economy I is our baseline case, with wage contract lasting four quarters
on average and bargaining weight of 0.5. Model Economy II is the alternative with three quarters
average wage contract and a bargaining weight of 0.7.
Overall the model economies do well in capturing the basic features of the data. Both come
reasonably close in capturing the standard deviations of the labor market variables relative to
output. They also come close to capturing the autocorrelation of all these variables as well as
the contemporaneous correlations with output. A distinguishing feature of our analysis is that
we appear to capture wage dynamics. Note that both calibrations come very close the matching
the relative volatility of wages (0.43 and 0.44 versus 0.46 in the data) and the contemporaneous
correlation of wages with output (0.61 and 0.71 versus 0.65) in the data. The model autocorrelation
of wages are a bit high (0.96 and 0.95 versus 0.84 in the data). This may be in part because the
BLS measure of wages we used includes beneﬁts. A pure measure of wages, average hourly earnings
of production workers (often used in the literature but available only over a shorter sample) yields
roughly the same standard deviation as the our measure, but a higher serial correlation, around
0.91, which is closer in line with the model-generated data.
Finally, we observe that Model Economy II performs about as well as I in explaining the data.1
1In the new calibration, the weight on productivity in the loglinear ﬂex wage equation is higher (ϕa goes from 0.52
to 0.71), so that the ﬂex wage absorbs a larger share of changes in productivity. However, in the new calibration, the




Marginal proﬁts go from about 20% to 9%.I fp r o ﬁts are smaller in equilibrium, a positive productivity shock induces
15Thus one can rely on wage contracts of an average length of only three quarters, given a bargaining
weight of 0.7, which lies within the range of model estimates.
Table 3: Aggregate Statistics
yw l s n u v θ a
US Economy: US Data 1951:1-2005:01
Relative Standard Deviation 1.00 0.46 0.51 0.62 5.81 6.59 12.10 0.62
Autocorrelation 0.84 0.84 0.73 0.92 0.86 0.90 0.89 0.77
C o r r e l a t i o nw i t hy 1.00 0.65 −0.29 0.77 −0.82 0.89 0.87 0.72
Model Economy I: 4Qa n dη =0 .5
Relative Standard Deviation 1.00 0.43 0.55 0.47 4.70 6.55 10.76 0.73
Autocorrelation 0.86 0.96 0.67 0.92 0.92 0.85 0.90 0.79
C o r r e l a t i o nw i t hy 1.00 0.61 −0.58 0.94 −0.94 0.94 0.96 0.97
Model Economy II: 3Qa n dη =0 .7
Relative Standard Deviation 1.00 0.44 0.43 0.52 5.15 7.49 11.94 0.68
Autocorrelation 0.86 0.95 0.59 0.89 0.89 0.78 0.86 0.79
C o r r e l a t i o nw i t hy 1.00 0.71 −0.48 0.95 −0.95 0.88 0.95 0.98
Finally, we consider the importance of the spillovers for model dynamics. To do so, we simulate
the model, eliminating the spillover eﬀects on wage dynamics. In particular, we set equal to zero
the parameter τ in equations (41) and (42), which governs the magnitude of the spillover eﬀect.
Table 4 presents the results. For comparison, in the top panel we show again the results for our
baseline case, Model Economy I (with the spillover eﬀects included.) The bottom panel shows the
same economy, but with the spillovers gone. As the table makes clear, eliminating the spillovers
signiﬁcantly enhances wage ﬂexibility and reduces employment volatility. The relative volatility of
wages jumps nearly ﬁfty percent, from 0.43 to 0.62. Conversely, the relative volatility of employment
roughly in half, from 0.47 to 0.26. The other measures of labor activity, u, v and θ similarly fall by
about half. Thus the wage inertia and resulting employment dynamics in our model are not only a
product of staggered multi-period wage contracting, but also of the spillover eﬀects from the Nash
bargaining process.
a larger percentage increase in proﬁts.
16Table 4: The Spillover Eﬀect
yw l s n u v θ a
Model Economy I
Relative Standard Deviation 1.00 0.43 0.55 0.47 4.70 6.55 10.76 0.73
Autocorrelation 0.86 0.96 0.67 0.92 0.92 0.85 0.90 0.79
C o r r e l a t i o nw i t hy 1.00 0.61 −0.58 0.94 −0.94 0.94 0.96 0.97
Model Economy I - No Spillover
Relative Standard Deviation 1.00 0.62 0.51 0.26 2.58 3.78 5.98 0.84
Autocorrelation 0.83 0.93 0.59 0.89 0.89 0.77 0.85 0.79
C o r r e l a t i o nw i t hy 1.00 0.81 −0.52 0.95 −0.95 0.93 0.97 0.99
5 Comparison with other literature (to be added)
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
We have modiﬁed the Mortensen and Pissarides model of unemployment dynamics to allow for
staggered multiperiod wage contracting. What emerges is a tractable relation for wage dynamics
that is a natural generalization of the period-by-period Nash bargaining outcome in the conventional
formulation. An interesting side-product is the emergence of spillover eﬀects aggregate wages that
inﬂuence the bargaining process. We then show that reasonable calibration of the model can account
for the reasonably well for the cyclical behavior of wages and labor market activity observed in the
data. The spillover eﬀects turn out to be important in this respect.
As we noted earlier, in addition to the presence of the spillover eﬀects, another important
diﬀerence from existing macroeconomic models that rely on staggered multi-period wage setting is
that within in our framework wages aﬀect the adjustment of employment on the extensive margin
as opposed to the intensive margin. As Hall has recently emphasized, for adjustment on the
intensive margin, wages may not be allocational, as originally argued by Barro (1997). The same
criticism, however, does not apply to adjustment on the extensive margin. For this reason it may
be interesting to consider our approach and employment adjustment along the extensive margin as
a way to shore up a potential weakness of these conventional macroeconomic models.
17[Incomplete]
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19APPENDIX I
A. Sum of expected future wages for a renegotiating ﬁrm, Wt (r)





s Λt,t+swt+s (i)=wt (i)+(ρβ)EtΛt,t+1wt+1 (i)+(ρβ)
2 EtΛt,t+2wt+2 (i)+...
• For a ﬁrm renegotiating at time t, the current and future expected wages are given by:
wt (r)=w∗
t
Etwt+1 (r)=λwt (r)+( 1− λ)Etw∗
t+1
= λw∗
t +( 1− λ)Etw∗
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B. Value of a marginal worker for a renegotiating ﬁrm, Jt (r)
• Value of an additional worker for a ﬁrm


































C. Worker surplus at a renegotiating ﬁrm, Ht (r)
• Worker surplus
Ht (r)=wt (r) − b − stβEtΛt,t+1Ht+1 + ρβEtΛt,t+1Ht+1 (r)




s Λt,t+s [b + st+sβΛt+s,t+s+1Ht+s+1]








b + st+sβΛt+s,t+s+1Ht+s+1 − (1 − λ)(ρβ)Λt+s,t+s+1∆t+s+1w∗
t+s+1
¤
D. The contract wage
21• The Nash ﬁrst-order condition is
ηJt (r)=( 1− η)Ht (r)

















































+( 1− η)(b + stβEtΛt,t+1Ht+1)
E. The expected average worker surplus
• Consider now the relation between EtHt+1 and EtHt+1 (r).
• First note that, for a ﬁrm renegotiating at time t,w eh a v e :
Et (wt+1 − wt+1 (r)) = Et
£






t +( 1− λ)w∗
t+1
¤
= λ(wt − w∗
t)
Et (wt+2 − wt+2 (r)) = Et
£





λwt+1 (r)+( 1− λ)w∗
t+2
¤
= Etλ(wt+1 − wt+1 (r))
= λ2 (wt − w∗
t)
and so on....
22• Then, we can write:





s Λt+1,t+s+1 (wt+s+1 − wt+s+1 (r))
= λ
h
1+( ρλβ)EtΛt+1,t+2 +( ρλβ)




= λ∆t+1 (wt − w∗
t)
• Using this equation in the Nash condition, we get:
ηEtJt+1 (r)=( 1 − η)EtHt+1 (r)
=( 1 − η)(EtHt+1 − λ∆t+1 (wt − w∗
t))




EtJt+1 (r)+Etλ∆t+1 (wt − w∗
t)




κxt (r)+βEtΛt,t+1λ∆t+1 (wt − w∗
t)
F. The hiring rate at a renegotiating ﬁrm, xt (r)
• Consider now the relation between b xt and b xt (r).
• First note that loglinearizing the job creation condition yields:
b xt (i)=Etb Λt,t+1 + β (κx)
−1
³
fnEt b fnt+1 − wEt b wt+1 (i)
´
+ β (x + ρ)Etb xt+1 (i)
W ec a nt h e nw r i t e :
b xt (r) − b xt = βw(κx)
−1 Et (b wt+1 − b wt+1 (r)) + β (x + ρ)Et (b xt+1 (r) − b xt+1)
which can be iterated forward to give:
b xt (r) − b xt = βw(κx)
−1 Et (b wt+1 − b wt+1 (r))
+β (x + ρ)βw(κx)
−1 Et (b wt+2 − b wt+2 (r))
+β2 (x + ρ)
2 βw(κx)
−1 Et (b wt+2 − b wt+3 (r))
+...
23• Substituting the expressions for the expected future wages at a ﬁrm renegotiating at time t
and rearranging, we obtain:
b xt (r) − b xt = βw(κx)
−1
h
λ(b wt − b w∗
t)+λβλ(x + ρ)(b wt − b w∗
t)+λ(βλ)
2 (x + ρ)






1+βλ(x + ρ)+( βλ)
2 (x + ρ)
2 + ...
i
(b wt − b w∗
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= λβw(κx)
−1 (1 − (x + ρ)λβ)
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The complete loglinear model
Variables
n
b mt,b nt,b ut,b vt, b qt,b st,b xt,b λt,b ct,b rt,b zt, b wt, b w
flex
t , b yt, b fnt,b kt, b It,b at
o
• Technology
b yt = b at + αb kt +( 1− α)b nt (E1)
• Resource constraint
b yt = cyb ct + iyb It +( 1− cy − iy)(2b xt + b nt) (E2)
where cy = c
y,i y= I





b mt = σb ut +( 1− σ)b vt (E3)
• Employment dynamics
b nt+1 = ρb nt +( 1− ρ) b mt (E4)
• Transition probabilities
b qt = b mt − b vt (E5)
b st = b mt − b ut (E6)
• Unemployment





b kt+1 =( 1− δ)b kt + δb It (E8)
25• Aggregate vacancies
b xt = b qt + b vt − b nt (E9)
• Consumption-saving






b λt = b uct (E12)
• Aggregate hiring rate
b xt = Etb Λt,t+1 +( β/κx)
³
fn b fnt+1 − wEt b wt+1
´
+ β (x + ρ)Etb xt+1 (E13)
• Marginal product of labor is
b fnt = b yt − b nt (E14)
• Capital renting
b yt − b kt = b zt (E15)
• Aggregate wage
b wt = γb b wt−1 + γflexb w
flex
t + γfEt b wt+1 (E16)
where
γ =
(1 − λ)(1− ρλβ)
λ
τ =( 1− η)sλβ + η(x + s)λβ (1 − ρλβ)(1− (x + ρ)λβ)
−1
φ =1+τ + γ + ρβ




t = ϕfn b fnt + ϕxb xt + ϕsb st (E17)
where ϕfn = ηfnw−1,ϕ x = ηκx(x + s)w−1 and ϕs = ηκxsw−1
• Technology process


























































































































































Figure 2: The spillover effect